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Making .Sense of Complex Industries
Abstract
Many strategic management models either ignore or severly
underestimate the complexity present in most strategic
situations. This paper identifies some of the key sources of
complexity and suggests some ways in which this complexity can be
handled. It argues for the importance of the fine-grained
historical industry study in identifying key strategic dimensions
and suggests that is should be supplemented with the more
fashionable strategic groups analysis.

Introduce j on
During the last two decades, in particular, a substantial
body of literature has been developed in the fields of strategic
management, strategic planning,, corporate and business policy and
related topics. This literature, which is admirably reviewed in
Schendel and Hofer (1979), owes much to the prior writings of
Alfred Chandler [1962, 1977] and the decades of case writing and
research undertaken at the Harvard Business School.
MOre recent ly strategic management has been subject to
scrutiny through a wide variety of disciplinary
-lenses" and
models, including Porter's influential volume (Porter (1980)) on
competitive strategy.
These "partial" models have been borrowed from such
disciplines as industrial organization, organizational behavior,
international business, and decision theory. However, many of
these "partial" models either ignore or severely underestimate
the complexity present in most strategic situations.
A careful review of sources of strategic complexity (see
Bower (1982), Porter (1980)) will almost always give priority to
the international context, technical change, the competitive
environment and government/political intersections at or near the
top of the list.
The examination of strategic complexity through many
different "lenses" provides strategists with a series of
opportunities with which to better understand complex strategic
situations. Yet the very diversity of these disciplinary per-
spectives means that strategists have to assess the implications
of using each approach and judge between the often conflicting
conclusions offered by the set of "partial" models.
This paper argues that many constituencies try to "make
sense" of complex industry environments. These range from
industrial organization researchers (such as Porter (1980, 1982),
Caves (1980), Teece (1984), Nelson and Winter (1982), Rumelt
(1981), Williamson (1975, 1981) and Schmalensee (1982)) who
attempt to develop richer economic theory through to firm-level
strategists and governmental policy-makers (e.g. anti-trust) who
try to understand the bases for competition in particular
industry environments.
In a paper written for an anti-trust symposium Porter, (1981:
449-451) stresses the value of in-depth industry histories in
understanding industry environments and identifying firms 1
strategic interactions on a longitudinal basis. He recognizes
four main advantages: (Porter, 1981:. 450).
"First, its emphasis is longitudinal, built around
a careful re-creation of competitive moves and other
events in the sequence in which they occurred. Second,
it is broad and quite detailed in its coverage of firmbehavior and industry events rather than focusing on
one or a few elements of competitive behavior such asinvestment or pricing. Third, it emphasizes the
uncertainties present in predicting the future that
bear on the decisions facing firms. Fourth, it places
great emphasis on a full and complete description of
each major competitor, including its full range of
activities in all markets in which it competes, and a
great deal of emphasis on "internal" factors such as
the identity and backgrounds of management, the
evolving organizational arrangements in place, et
cetera.
In the same paper (1981: 474) Porter also points out that
there is an increasing incidence of industries in which strategic
interaction is global. Such global industries must also be
studied in depth since they change the rules of the competitive
environment (Gluck (1983)). Thus, if f irms more clearly
understand the nature of global competition then they should be
better able to re-formulate their competitive strategies.
Porter's strong endorsement of the industry history approach
supports an important proposition in this paper, namely, that
further "rich", fine-grained (Harrigan (1983)), in-depth,
industry studies should be carried out with the aim of developing
richer hypotheses and theories about strategic interaction,
competitive strategy and global competition. Such studies should
attempt to make sense of the set of complex, competitive environ-
ments by careful questioning of a number of issues. For example,,
what analogies or experiences (Porter, 1980, Chapter 3) do
managements draw upon in addressing particular strategic
problems? Do they develop strategies from insights gained
through "personal" experience or from the examination of
strategies borrowed from other firms? Alternatively, do they
identify competitive concepts and approaches as shared by
industry members and base their strategies on competitive norms?
What are the external forces such as technology which lead to
change in the bases of an industry competition? what are the
appropriate units of analysis? What are the industry and
environmental conditions which affect strategy formulation and
shape the cost of changing position within an industry? Thus,
with complexity better integrated into the analysis more insight
can then be gained about what constitutes a global industry and
how global strategies may be formulated.
.
The purpose of this paper is firstly to provide a review of
various definitions and important concepts (such as value-added
chains) which will be used in the paper. The authors argue that
richer industry studies need to be written and draw from their
own recent experience with major contemporary industry studies.
This includes such industries as personal computers, repro-
graphics and automobiles. Generalizations and common factors
emerging from a study of the reprographics industry are then
identified. Some implications for theory development, research
design, methodology and data base construction will complete the
paper.
o
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Literature Review
Introductory
There has been much discussion in the recent literature of
industrial organization about whether the firm or industry or
some other intra-industry group stratification (the so-called
strategic group (Porter (1980: 129)) is the appropriate unit for
analysis. it is clear that most business firms are multi-
product, sell in more than one market and have grown by
diversification. The industry as conventionally understood
produces a range of different products all of which are not close
substitutes, and uses a variety of technical production
processes. it, therefore, becomes unclear where the boundaries
of the industry should be drawn. Many economists have concluded
that the concepts of market and industry should be viewed as
complementary and the emphasis employed should reflect
the problems under consideration. According to Joan Robinson
(1956):
"Questions relating to competition, monooolv andoligopoly must be considered in terms of Markets
ProgresT Voc f 1f^??^"9 1/b0r ' profits ' technicalp ogres , l alization and so forth have ^^ k=
considered in terms of industries." be
The newer concept of strategic groups focuses upon the
importance of intra-industry strategic groupings in understanding
differences across firms within an industry. it fits neatly
between the supply idea of an industry and the demand idea of a
market The defining characteristics of strategic groups arise
from the nature of the mobility barriers (Caves and Porter
(1977)) and i solating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1981) which protect the
groups. The~ three s^rTes of mobility barriers most commonly
advanced (McGee and Thomas (1984)) are market related strategies,
general supply characteristics of the industry, and the
organizational and boundary choices of the firm - each of them
being decision variables for the firm.
Strategic groups offer an opportunity for business policy
researchers and business strategists to enrich their
understanding of the nature of industries and the. strategic
interactions amongst firms. m particular, the concept offers a
distinctive slant on the identification of relative competitive
position and suggests a systematic and comprehensive way of
assessing strategic capability in terms of the framework of
relative competitive advantage.
The literature review which follows builds upon this notion
of assessing f irm strategic capability by reference to the
industries and environments in which firms operate. First, the
authors review the rich tradition of research in industry-based
studies and industry histories and conclude, inter alia, that
there is a lack of established methodologies for treating
complexity. Second, key sources of industry complexity are
identified including notions of mobility barriers, value chains
and global industries. Third, research in other areas of social
science, notably organizational behavior and psychology is
briefly reviewed. This is attempted in order to provide further
insights into how strategists may reason by analogy or imitate
other firm strategies in the context of strategic decision-
making. It is possible that better industry sense-making will
result from examination of these alternative perspectives. As an
example, the discussion of alternative perspectives is focussed
around the strategic group concept, a device formulated by Porter
(1980) to make sense of competition and competitive advantage.
The findings of recent empirical grouping studies are reviewed to
determine whether they provide useful insights for firm conduct
and competitive strategic interaction in the context of complex
industries.
Industry Studies
Many different intellectual traditions are represented in
industry-level studies. These range from business history to the
domain of industrial organization economics and involve numerous
researchers and research approaches. Table I lists some of the
main features and perspectives of each approach and provides
references to researchers whose work is most closely associated
with those perspectives.
TABLE I ABOUT HERE
The main differences in the conduct of alternative types of
industry studies are shown in Table I. m particular, they vary
in terms of the aims and purposes of each type of study and the
research methodology used by the investigator. For example, more
narrowly defined data sets (drawn from government and industry-
level sources, and more refined and sophisticated analytical
approaches (often using econometric techniques) are used to gain
answers to specific questions concerning industry-level
profitability, efficiency and monopoly power. This more narrow
purpose and focus has been extensively used in traditional
industrial organization studies, some anti-trust analyses and in
assessing the economic impacts of technology and research and
development in different industries. More detailed, broader
purpose studies have been developed for case study a„a teaching
purposes, and have been evident in some more recent anti-trust
cases (Sullivan (1981)) and industrial policy debates (Lawrence
and oyer ,1983 ,). ?ese studies generally .^^ ^^ ^^
analysis and allow the writer selectivity in the choice of data
insights and phenomena reported. An underlying aim of these
broader studies is to reflect the contextual complexity of
industry studies. Therefore, they report a wide range of firm-
level phenomena includinq is<snec ^^ «-9 l su s of organizational design,
leadership, and strategy to achieve firm objectives. The focus
of many of these studies is on the firm as the unit of analysis,
and seeks to enrich understanding about the strategic interaction
and rivalry between competitors and on the role of the general
TABLE I: DIFFERENT FORMS OF INDUSTRY 9TimTF«;
MAJOR INTELEECTUAL
TRADITION
Industrial
Organization
Economics
Business
History
Public
Policy
Strategy
Technology
_PURPOSE
Study of Industry
Structure,
Behavior,
Performance,
Judgment of
Competition,
Profitability,
Efficiency and
Monopoly Power.
Mapping industry/
business evolution
through time.
Insight into
historical
evolution of
business organi-
zations and the
role of strategist/
entrepreneur.
_DATA_BASE
Typically published
government or
industry source
data
UNIT OF
.ANALYSIS
Industry Level
Monitoring of
Competition
Policy
-Anti-Trust '
-Mergers
Development of
Industrial Policy
Orations
Case Developmen t
-Teaching
Industry Analysis
-Firm Strategies
-Generic
Strategies
Impacts of
Technology on
Industry
,
Diffusion of
Innovations,
Economics of
R&D, First/
Second Mover
Advantages?
Mix of Sources
-Government
Statistics
-Annual Reports
-Newspapers
-Biographies
-Published Speeches
Mainly industry but
also business focus.
Government
Statistics,
Industry Level
Investigation
Focussed studies
of companies using
Annual Reports,
Speeches, etc.
Mainly industry
level.
Mix of Sources
-Statistics
-Annual Reports
-Business
Periodicals
-Company Visits
Use of Compustat,
PIMS Data Base
Industry Level
Data Bases
of Economic,
Patent and Research
Activity
Phenomena
Usually Tailor
Made
Firm Level
Finn and industry
level
Mainly industry
level
RESEARCH
.APPROACHES
Mainly statistical/
econometric.
Some case studies
but rich tradition
of European
researchers in
industry case
studies.
...REFERENCES
Porter (196
Scherer (19
Shepherd (1
Longitudinal
Analysis
-History
-Content Analysis
-Analysis of
Speeches
-Newer Statistical
Analysis
Adams (1977
Shaw and
Sutton ( i
Bateman (198
Chandler (19
197
Cole (1959)
Mainly statistical
analysis.
Some richer mapping,
industry history
studies involving
firm/organization
conduct.
Case writer
selectivity
Participant
observation
Rich case observa-
tions with statis-
tical, matrix
mapping analysis.
Mainly statistical,
econometric.
More process,
firm-level in the
diffusion of
innovations
Porter (1981)
Salop (1981)
Sullivan (198
Lawrence and
Dyer (1933)
Reich (1983)
Andrews (1971
Christensen,
Andrews et a.
(1980)
Clueck (1980)
30,Porter (193
19S2)
Harrigan (1983
Freeman (1983)
Kantrow (1982)
Mansfield (196!
1977)
Schendel,
Cooper (1977
i
manager as the architect of organizational direction and purpose.
Clearly, these industry studies offer many different, but
not always synthesized insights into the analysis of competitive
-
advantage in complex industry settings. However, some general
conclusions emerge for the conduct both of future studies and for
theory development. First, there seem to be a lack of both
established metholodologies, and rules of evidence, for handling
problem complexity and reporting complex phenomena in a
systematic fashion in order to allow replication by other
researchers. Second, in the more finely defined studies there is
often a denial of complexity (and the role of other information
and evidence) in formulating particular relatively narrow
hypotheses and in establishing or refuting the validity of these
hypotheses. Third, the theoretical and methodological cross
currents from the different disciplines do not seem to be
integrated effectively and thus do not lead to richer investi-
gations of complex phenomena.! As a result it appears that
current industry studies of complex phenomena do not make clear
contributions to the development of theory in the specialist
disciplines and intellectual traditions. While this is „
continuing difficulty in the management research field, the
search for a useful measure of reconciliation and synthesis
amongst the various forms of industry studies can have both
theoretical and practical advantages in regard to the advancement
of strategic management. Perhaps themes such as policy dialogue
«h»«U984>) and triangulation in research strategy to achieve
Notable exceptions are Porter (1982} * n ,q u=, •Cl \ ± y°*J a d Hamgan (1983).
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convergence of conclusions (Denzin (1978), Jick (1979) may
facilitate the search for mechanisms to enrich the newer inter-
disciplinary theories such as Rumelt's (1981) Strategic Theory of
the Firm and Nelson and Winter's (1982) Evolutionary theory of
the firm.
Sources £f Complexity
A number of writers, particularly Aldrich (1979), Caves and
Porter (1977), Galbraith and Schendel (1982), HcGee and Thomas
(1984), Porter (1980: 127-128) and Rumelt (1981) have addressed
a wide range of economic, organizational and environmental
sources of complexity affecting strategic decision-making at the
firm level. Table 2 provides a listing of sources of complexity
drawn mainly from these references. For example, concepts such
as mabiliix barrie r s (Caves and Porter (1977) and iiisliULilia
mzzhznlzms. (Rumelt (1981)) together define from primarily
economic perspectives, key strategies available to firms, or
groups of firms within industries, and link them to unique firm
advantages and characteristics such as the possession of an
important financial resource or technological advantage. Aldrich
(1979), Ackoff (1970) and others have stressed the difficulties
of organizations' adapting to their environments and matching
strategies to changing circumstances. They argue that complexity
involves both controllable or, at least partially controllable
variables such as marketing, financial and production decisions
and uncontrollable variables such as changes in technology and
governmental policy. while the former endogenous variables are
11
largely controllable by management, uncontrollable (exogenous)
variables influence strategy formulation but cannot be directly
handled. The organization's ability to handle environmental
change is perhaps the key challenge to strategists in the 1980's.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Drucker (1980) in his book entitled ilajLiaiJia in Turbu lPnf
limfiS suggests that the trend towards global competition
represents the most significant structural change facing
businesses and governments today. Porter, like Drucker, makes a
distinction between international competition and global
competition. 'A global industry is one in which the strategic
positions of competitors in major geographic or national markets
are fundamentally affected by their overall global positions"
(Porte
(
r, 1980: 275).
Globalization, therefore, can be examined as a major
environmental change. How should organizations confronting
globalization seek to modify their strategic positions? Kogut
(1984). and Williams (1984), amongst others, endorse the viewpoint
that the concept of the "value-added- chain is a useful framework
with which to understand the bases of industry membership and
global competition and thereby develop adaptive corporate
strategies. Williams (1984: 2) defines "value-added" in the
following terms: "Loosely put,
-value-added' is defined as what
is added to the product during its production. The "value-added-
influences productivity achieved by a firm and its cost structure
over time. The impact of the value added is reflected in
competitive behavior, and, in turn, the formation of strategic
12
TABLE 2
KEY SOURCES OF COMPLEXITY
Endogenous Factors
Organization and
Management
Issues
Ownership Structure
-Single Business v. Multi-Business
Capital Structure
-Leverage, Relationship to Parent
Organization Structure
-Design of Organizational Systems
and Procedures
Aims
Firm aims to develop firm
embodied skills such as
unique resources, reputation
image, development of patents,
etc
Competitors and Markets Competitors : Number, Type,
Geographic Position
Markets: Geographic Coverage of
Markets: Global/National
Market Segmentation
Product-Line and Marketing
Mix
Firm aims to develop a sense
of competition and of sources
of competitive advantage in
market niches.
Product Initiation and
Development
Value Added Chain Length
Substituation Patterns
Vertical Integration and Dependen
Horizontal Relatedness
Scale Effects
R&D Capability
Nature of Manufacturing Process
ce
Firm aims to capture rents, value
added where appropriate
Exogenous Factors
International Trade
Technology
Government
Issues
Globalization
Competitive/Comparative Advantage
Aims
Firms aims to assess the effects
on the value chain of the linkagebetween national base distinctive
skills and internationalization.
Firm aims to assess effect on
value chain of changes in
technology. Clear effects on
competitive advantage.
Firm aims to assess effect on
value chain of government
m„..„ ^, intervention.Note. This Table adopted from Aldrich H97f» a «. c.Porter (1980) "^ (197°^ **off. Calbraith and Schendel (1982), Hufsi and Thomas (1984).
Inventions, Innovation, Technological
Government as Policy Formulator,
Rule Setter, Owner/Purchaser
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groups within an industry."
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In Table 3, a modified version of Williams categorization of
industries in terms of "value-added- is presented to throw light
upon the linkage between "value-added" and globalization. Kogut
(1984) provides additional important insights although defining
the value-added chain in terms of contribution to the market
value of the firm. He argues that a measure of economic rents is
needed which identifies excess return on investment for each link
of the value-added chain. Firm strategies in country-centered
markets are, typically, based on specialization in specific links
of the value-added chain. However, in global markets strategies
rest on the exploitation of economics captured along and between
value-added chains
- (Kogut (1984): 2). Kogut thus adds the
concept of economies of scope (Teece (1980)), the sharing of
resources to achieve synergy, to economies of scale and learning
effects in order to capture the process of exploitation of
economic advantage along multiple value-added chains.
It should be noted that the use of the term "value-chains-
is associated with the firm's decision process in relation to
business-unit competition. Firms have a set of alternativ
"value-chains" from which they can choose and this choice result
in different competition sets and strategic postures. The firm's
strategic aim is to match its distinctive skills (or strategic
capabilities) with one of the alternative competition sets
available in the environment. Once this strategic choice is made
14
TABLE 3
Definition of Industry
Types
TAXONOMY OF INDUSTRIES BY VALUE-ADDED/PROniTrTTVTTV BASE
Characteristics and Focus
of Competitive Advantage Examples
i
Sensitivity to
Globalization
Class I - Value Added is
Constrained From Achieve-
ment of Significant Cost-
Based Productivity Increase
Through Economies of Scale
or Learning by Doing
Fragmented Industries
Competition in Terms of:
Geography, Reputation of
Individuals, Regulation,
Individualized Service,
Creative Skills, Custom
Engineering
Computer Software,
Entertainment,
Investment Banking,
Consulting,
Embryonic
Technologies
Low
Resistant to Clobalizatt
because numerous barrier
to consolidation of supp
and demand
Class II - Value Added
Characterized by
Modest Cost-Based
Productivity Through
Learning by Doing and
Economies of Scale
Low Cost Rivalry
Differentiated Rivalry
(Premium Price)
Focused Rivalry
(Specialization in Small
"ub-Segments)
Manufacturing
Assembly Based
Industries
-Steel, Glass,
Tire, Appliances,
Chemicals,
Automated Services
Moderately susceptible
Autos - yes
Some, but not all heavy
manufacturing
Class III - Value Added
Which is Subject to
Extremely Rapid Cost-Based
Productivity Gains Through
Learning by Doing and
Economies of Scale
Rapid Technolog ical
Change and Information
Transfer
Rivalry
-Product Technology
-Process Technology
-Commodity Technology
Serai-Conductors
Fiber-Optics
Consumer Electronics
Telecommunications
Vulnerable to
globalization
-Few global or cultural
barriers
Transition - Value Added
Shifting Permanently
from One Productivity
Base to Another
Hybrid - Value Added
Coupled in Two or More
Productivity Bases
Fundamental Change
in Bases of Competition
Through Deregulation,
Patents, Manufacturing
Innovations, etc.
Identification of
of Competitive
Advantage
Difficult
Retail Banking
(I -> II)
Telecommunications
(I -> II -» III)
Biotechnology
(I -> III)
CAD/ CAM
Robotics
Personal computers
Dependent on
stage of transition
Not clear, situation
specific
I
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the examination of the forces which drive the "value chain" leads
firms towards an understanding and definition of an "industry"
(whether global or country-centered) within which competition
takes place. Close examination of the final customers for each
value chain leads to the definition of markets and allows more
complex analyses of competition and market segmentation to be
undertaken.
It is proposed here that the value-added chain concept is an
important means of organizing firm-level understanding of complex
situations, Table 3, using "value chain" ideas, provides a
.framework both for forming strategic groups within industry
settings and for analyzing the potential sensitivity of each
industry setting to the threat of globalization. Table 2 shows
clearly that strategy formulation can become more complex in
environments of global competition. Factors such as the
influence of distinctive firm skills in particular country
markets, and the role of government policies in setting the
"rules of the game" in many countries can complicate firms-
strategic choices. Governments often operate strategically in
international trade through the formation of state-owned enter-
prises as competitors (Hafsi and Thomas (1984)) and the
establishment of quota control or subsidy policies for "home-
based" enterprises.
Kogut (1984: 38, 39) shows that full awareness of
international competition does not follow simply from an
extension of the strategic analysis of competition in country-
centered markets. He believPQ <-k=,4- ™~D i es that more research should be
carried out on under stand ina srr a f „'og t tegic groups in the
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international domain and on managing the environmental variance
of world competition. He concludes by identifying some of the
parameters which are important in making sense of globalization
and global markets:
"Global positioning consists, therefore, of threeelements. First, is the transferring of strategicassets between different markets which permit theexploitation of the economies of scale, scope, learningand real options. Second is the differentiation ofproducts to adapt to national arenas and to exploit up-stream competitive advantages. The third element isthe flexibility and bargaining strength that a multi-national network provides in managing stakeholders indiverse environments."
In summary, the argument in this section of the literature
review promotes the importance of the "value chain" in
understanding the bases for industry competition in settings
involving complexity (as shown in Table 2). The major
environmental structural force of globalization and the resulting
formation of global industries is discussed as an example of
complexity and the role of the value chain in aiding strategy
formulation is assessed (see Table 3).
In the next section some alternative cognitive and
organizational perspectives for making sense of industry
complexity are discussed using the strategic groups concept as an
example.
gense-Ma Kinn and gfciatfigjg r.r^r ^
The term "strategic groups" was originally coined by Michael
S. Hunt in his doctoral dissertation (1972) to contribute to his
exploration of the performance of the white goods industry in the
1960's. Porter (1980: 129) provides the accepted definition of
17
a strategic group in terms of the similarity of competitive
behavior:
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The main studies in the area of strategic groups are
summarized in Table 4. Most of these studies are "data-driven".
That is, they identify a number of key strategic dimensions drawn
from Porter's (1980: 127) or McGee and Thomas (1984) listing of
key strategic variables and typically use cluster analysis with
data bases such as COMPUSTAT to form groups of firms who
"cluster" together in terms of their observed strategic behavior.
Yet despite ten years of research there remains confusion about
the concept and its linkage to the strategic management of firms.
Criticisms have been voiced about whether the observed groups
make sense to strategists or other interested parties. Little
follow-up with industry participants has been reported except in
the case of the continuum of rich studies of the beer industry
carried out at Purdue (Batten (1974), Batten and Schendel (1977)
and Hatten and Batten (1984)). We have little knowledge to tell
us why some firms position their strategies close to those of
other firms. A study of strategists' beliefs and perceptions
about competition and competitors in particular industries is
clearly needed to identify the frameworks they use in
competitive positioning. This would provide an awareness of
18
TABLE 4
STRATEGIC GRO
iJPs=__PR£vioiJS STTOIES
Studv
Hunt (1972)
Industry
"White Goods
Basis for Strate gic
££ou_pForcation
Newman (1973,
1978)
Porter (1973)
34 4 digit
"Producer Goods
Industries:
Chemical Pmr.c,^
38 3 digit
"Consumer Goods
u -, Industries
Schendel (1977)
Hatten, Schendel Brewing IndustTv""and Cooper (1978)
i ry
Caves and Pugel
(1980)
Ryans and
Wittink (1982)
U »S. Manufacturing
.Industry
—Sample
19 Consumer Goods
Industries from
Compustat
Airline Industry
Baird and
Sudharsan
(1983)
Office Equipment/
Electronic Computing
Primeaux (1983)
Howell and
Prazier (1983)
Textiles
Petroleum
Medical Supply
and Equipment
i
- degree of product
diversification
- differences in product
differentiation
- extent of vgrticaj IntegraHnn
Decree of Vertjj^ — n
Integration
Relative Size of Firm
~ Leader/Follower Classification
Manufacturing Variables
~ Number, Age, Capital Intensic
of Plants
.Marketing VariahTpg
" Number of brands, price, and
receivables/sales
Itruc tural Variablpg
8-firB concentration ratio
.." firm sizp
.Manufacturing, Marketing ,nH "
Financial V_ariables. (Leverage,
Merger/Acquisition Bghavtor
Relative Size of Firm
Product Strategy
- Advertising/Sales Ratio
Financial StratPtnr
Clustering of Residuals fromCapital Asset Pricing Model
.(Security Returns)
Financial S trategy V^TTm
- Leverage, Current Ratio,
Return on Assets, Dividend
Payment Ratio, Times Interest
.
Earned, Size
Sizi
.Investmen t Behavior
Customer Groups Served
Customer Needs Served
-(due to Abell (1980))
I
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those key controllable strategic dimensions which strategists-
perceive to be important in formulating competitive strategy in
the industry. Thus, adding the perceptual data drawn from
individual decision-makers to the economic models of competition
provided by industrial organization economics perspectives should
enable a more general framework for identifying important
strategic variables to be developed. •
Although Porter (1980: 127/8) lists thirteen variables as
sources of strategic differences and variability, he suggests
that maybe two to four strategic dimensions should be selected
for close attention and that group maps or graphs involving two
variables at a time should be drawn to make sense of the
particular strategic dimensions at hand. Such mapping processes
are a means of getting the strategists to "frame" the problem
correctly (McCaskey (1982)), to sense the existence of strategic
groupings and to simplify the problem around a number of key
strategic dimensions. According to Spender (1981) and Huff
(1982), strategists may also borrow "recipes" for strategies from
other firms in the industry, particularly strategic groups, and
also from a wider set of firms. Through examining these recipes
and reasoning by analogy to other sets of experience, strategists
may develop other bases for grouping firm behavior.
The search for taxonomies of strategy 2 (Hambrick (1984))
also suggests that strategists need such models of competitive
behaviorjo provide benchmarks for strategy positioning. Hervis
2 Examples of such taxonomies are Miles and q„ ftu t e M(nD ,
^^modei oTg^ ^.SSffi" "W^i^Z^l
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and Rosen (1981) and other researchers in experimental psychology
express this need as the search for protypical and stereotypical
behavior. The firm closest to the prototype or stereotype then
becomes the focal member of the perceived strategic group and
provides the "benchmark" for identifying and evaluating key
strategic dimensions.
It should be noted that the concepts of mapping, of
taxonomies and of industry recipes together with economic theory
should lead to the better, and more "grounded" identification of
the key strategic dimensions (and sources of dissimilarity
between firms) for strategic group formation. Yet even if this
objective were to, be fully achieved, many problems would still
remain in linking the strategic groups concept to firm conduct
and the evolution of complex industry settings. In particular,
each of the following issues raises questions about the role of
strategic groups in analyzing competitive advantage. First,
which concept of strategy operat ional i zes the concept of
strategic groups? Is it strategy as intentions or strategy as
realizations? In other words we need to question whether many of
the factors which identify groups are in fact purposively
manipulated by the organization. Borrowing from a biological
perspective and an adaptive strategy viewpoint (Boudling (1956),
Pondy and Mitroff (1979) and Chaffee (1983)) it can be argued
that group membership is merely an observable manifestation of
viable niches in the environment and the organization's ability
to adapt to them. Organizations which exhibit certain survival
traits which cannot be known completely in advance remain.
Second, do significant performance differences exist between
21
strategic groups? Third, do stable strategic groups exist or do
their characteristics change over time? What are the
determinants of change in the membership of strategic groups?
Fourth, which external environmental forces "trigger" changes in
the character of strategic groups and their membership?
While each of these issues is an area of future research, it
is argued in this section that the strategic group concept is an
important device for making sense of competition and competitive
advantage. While there is much conceptual and practical
ambiguity surrounding the strategic groups notion, it does add
usefully to the vocabulary of competitive strategy. Indeed,
examining notions of strategic groups and patterns of competitive
behavior from the widest possible set of viewpoints is clearly
valuable.
Overall, the importance of using multiple frameworks is
stressed through the general, literature review. It is concluded
that by using better frameworks for identifying complexity, we
should be better able to synthesize and make sense of complex
industry settings particularly those global industries reviewed
in Table 3.
In the next section we use the concepts developed through
the literature review to argue for many "richer" industry-level
studies. Indeed, as an example, we present some insights from a
recent study carried out with a co-researcher at London Business
School, namely Agha Ghazanfar.
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The. Notion q£ a. "Rich" Industry Study:
The. Example Ql Office Reorographi r.^
It has been argued during this paper that the discipline of
strategic management offers a number of partial models and
insights for formulating firm-level strategies in complex
industries. Since the entire complexity of the industry is
important, we have proposed that rich industry studies should be
carried out both for theory development and for identifying key
strategic dimensions and bases for competition within industries.
Our proposition is consistent with Porter's (1981) plea for
industry Case- histories and Porter's (1982) thorough and .rich set
of causes on competitive strategy.
In studying the office reprographics industry a number of
different research lenses were used. For example, the history of
the industry in the U.K. was reviewed for the last one hundred
years to show how the industry has undergone a series of changes
as a result mainly of the influence of technological innovation.
Also, the strategic positions of firms were assessed in terms of
strategic behaviors along key dimensions. Simple strategic maps
were also used to assess methods for analyzing competitive
advantage and for forming strategic groups.
The aim of this study was to examine an industry
characterized by technological change in which it would be
possible to examine relationships between:
(i) technological change and "industry" and "market"boundaries
(ii) technological change and the strategic response offirms
Tha
n
k
QfllV\
e £?? t0 ^ha Ghazanfar from whose thesis (GhazanfarU984)) this section derives its empirical strength.
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The first stage of the study, using methodologies common in
the fields of business and economic history, concentrated upon
the growth of firms and industries. m particular it examined
the strategies of firms relative to industry development and
developed a typology of firms to categorize the different
strategic positions taken by industy participants.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
For example, Table 5 shows the movement of the eight firms
who entered the reprographics industry as single-technology
firms, or created a new industry, at different periods of time
over the 1880-1980 period. Some of these firms, - Xerox,
Letraset, Ofrex and Ricoh, - started diversifying out of their
basic business whilst it was still g C ow j l t1 g and became "related
product diversifiers" in terms of Rumelt's (1974) taxonomy of
diversification strategies. others such as Gestetner and Ozalid
diversified in a small way out of reprographics but remained
"dominant product" firms.
The companies shown in Table 5 all started out as single-
technology firms within the office reprographics industry. This
was not the case with the next set of firms which diversified
into the reprographics market from adjacent industries. There
were four "Dominant-Product " firms . IBM# 011yattlf A^ Mck ^
A.M.
-
that entered the reprographics market at different stages.
The most important of these was IBM entering in the early 1970's
when the plain-paper copying business was growing very rapidly.
The third set of firms who entered the industry was the
24
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^lated-Prodnrf Diversifies. Their diversification was related
to their photo-chemical technology and the exploitation of
synergistic links between the manufacture of optical equipment
(cameras), photographic film or paper and'such supplies. Three
of these firms were American-based multi-national operations
(Eastman Kodak, 3M and Nashua), one was European (Agfa-Gevaert)
and three were Japanese (Canon, Minolta and Konishiroku).
The reprographics industry can be seen, thus, to have
comprised different kinds of firms. These are classified in
Table 6. This classification suggests the following typology of
firms:
(i) SINGLE TECHNOLOGY PIONEERS/INNOVATORS
(ii) SPECIALIZED SINGLE TECHNOLOGY FIRMS ENTERING LATE
Uii) DOMINANT-PRODUCT FIRMS ENTERING DURING GROWTH PERIODAND REMAINING DOMINANT-PRODUCT FIRMS °
0
(IV) DOMINANT-PRODUCT FIRMS DIVERSIFYING FURTHER
(V) RELATED PRODUCT FIRMS DIVERSIFYING ONLY RPfAncp nPMARKET/TECHNOLOGY RELATEDNESS BEC USE OF
(VI) UNRELATED PRODUCT FIRMS
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
in summary, it should be noted that there were three kinds
of single technology firms: firstly, those which entered as
Pioneers and stuck to their technology. fiddly, those who
entered as pioneers but made strategic changes, and iMxdly those
that tried to cater to a world market as specialized, low-cost
manufacturers. The dominant category included a stable business
(IBM) that had reached a settled position and those that were in
the process of diversifying further and were still groping for a
26
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final shape to their portfolio. Related Product Firms did not
diversify further, suggesting a settled strategy based on
technology and market relatedness. These characteristics are
shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
The next stage of the study involved an analysis of the
content of strategy at different levels within firms. In
particular, it examined whether there is any association between
this classification of strategic posture at the corporate level
and the operational strategies of firms.
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Table 8 gives a preliminary classification of the types of
strategies observed at the corporate level. The business
strategies of these firms will now be discussed briefly. In
particular, there will be a focus upon whether the study shows
any symmetry or linkage between:
(i) the SCOPE of activities of firms and
(ii) the FUNCTIONAL strategies of firms.
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
Table 9 lists some of the strategic elements of firms that
started off as single technology f irms
. It can be seen that of
the firms that started as single-technology companies, there were
three types of business strategies found in the 1970 's.
(i) The hardware
Strate
c manufacturers who pursued a Monopolising
gy using four entry barriers based upon thei r
28
TABLE 7
SINGLE-
TECHNOLOGY
FIRMS
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTRANT. TVTn ... „,.
gm gJ
Timing of Entry Nature of Entry Strategic change Vertica
._ „_ Intenrati'
(i) First-in :
Pioneers
(ii) First-in :
Pioneers
(iii) During
Innovation' Remain the same V.I.
1
Innovation Become Related- V.I.
Product
growth
Bf ed °n C ° St " Remai* th * sames °^ cn advantage Not
necessary
DOMINANT-
PRODUCT
FIRMS
(iv) Early-second
During
growth
(v) Late entrant:
During
growth
Appeal of brand Remain the same V.I.
name
Marketing network Diversify further Not fu 11
RELATED-
PRODUCT
FIRMS
(vi) Early-second:
During
growth
r
Technology or
market
relatedness
Remain the same Not
necessary
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TABLE 8
TYPES OF STRATEGIES OBSERVED AT THE CORPORA LEVE L
TYPE OF FIRM
1. Pioneer of the
past.
2. Dynamic
Innovators
Specialised
Low-cost
producers
Powerful
brand-name
entrant
Other entrants
attempting to.
exploit
brand names
Entrants
exploiting
•synergy
CORPORATE STANCE (STRATEGY)
Description
Single-Technology firms that
pioneered new products and
remained single-technology
firms or became Dominant-
Product
Single-Technology pioneers
that attempted to become
Related Product firms some
time after their innovations
Specialised Single-Technology
firms entering the industry
during growth period
Dominant-Product firms enter-ing industry during growth
period and remaining
Dominant
-Product
Dominant-Product firms "
entering industry during
growth period and qoing infor further diversification
Related-Product firms
diversifying into industry
because of market/technology
relatedness, and not
diversifying further.
FIRMS IN CATEGC
Gestetner
Ozalid
Rotaprint
Columbia
Xerox
Letraset
Ofrex
Ricoh
Mita Kogyo
Copyer
IBM
AM.
A.B.Dick
Olivetti
Agfa Gevaert
Canon
Minolta
Konishiroku
3M
Nashua
30
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functional strategies (patents, marketing network,brand name, integration). This strategy was based onproduct differentiation. Those who had innovated newproducts were prone to following this strategy.
(ii) The low-cost manufacturers of hardware. This was astrategy of hardware. This was a strategy of
s^£cia_li2Linct in production and was not one ofdifferentiated marketing.
(iii) The suppliers of low-cost consumable products. Thiswas the siL2p_lle_s strategy in the pursuit of whichproduct differentiation could be important butmonopolizing posture was not adopted.
The next category of firms was that of the related product
diversifiers. These Related Product Firms diversified
.into the
reprographics market because of marked and technology-
relatedness. What distinguished them from the previous sets of
firms was
££££&'. "" theY Were 2lready "lated-product
(i)
(U)
.c^Slef "" "^ remained related product
(iii)
rtMbS'.
that they did not follow the mon°P01 "i«g
The strategy of these firms was based on product
differentiation,
.and some of them (Canon, Minoita, Konishiroku)
were also low-cost manufacturers. However, what distinguished
them from the "monopolisers" was their policy towards
(i) patents
(ii) direct-selling networks
(iii) use of own-labels
(iv) vertical integration
(v) reliance on a single technology.
Along each of these strategic dimensions their policy was
different from that of the single-technology firms discussed
32
earlier. This is shown in Table 10.
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
The discussion of content of strategy in the second stage of
the study can now be integrated to provide descriptors of firms:
a taxonomy of strategies. The taxonomy of firms (similar to
Vesper (1979)), and based mainly on supply-side characteristics);
that emerges from this industry is thus of:
(i) MONOPOLIZING
- Eliminate competition, establishbarriers to entry, and control
resources.
(ii) COOPERATION
- Join forces with competitor to
ensure survival and continued
economic performance.
(iii) SPECIALIZATION
- Specialize in products and/or
production process
(iv) SUPPLIES
- supplier of low-cost consumable
products
The taxonomy, which should help in identifying sensible
bases for strategic group formation is shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
The third stage of the study used both the historical
analysis and the strategy taxonomy to develop strategic maps, and
hence strategic groups of firms in the industry along important
strategic dimensions. Some of these maps are shown in Tables 12-
16.
TABLES 12 THROUGH 16 ABOUT HERE
In these strategic groups maps we have focussed upon
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TABLE 11
A TAXONOMY OF FIRMS ACCORDING TO THEIR SCOPE OF
ACTIVATES AND PURSUIT OF BUSINESS STRATEGIES
STRATEGY CLASSIFTCATTnxr
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
SCOPE SINGLE & DOMINANT PRODUCT RELATED PRODUCT
D £GENERIC^ DIFFERENTIATION DIFFERENTIATION
TYPE
LOW COST
Z_\A
1
DIFFERENTIATION
MONOPOLISING SPECIALISATION SUPPLIES ^ ±.CO-OPERATION
FIRMS IBM Gestetner
Xerox Ozalid
Rotaprint
Mita
Copyer
3M
Agfa
Letraset
Ofrex
Columbia
Agfa
Nashua
Ricoh
Konishiroku
Minolta
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TABLE 12
COMMITMENT
TO
~"X
.Sales
copy****,
'
)UPL\CftTiNG
/
WKueaddfd/salhs > £TxT£NTOF
VERTICAL
INTcG^^tioN
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TABLE 13
SPECIALISATION
RftTlO
A
3-0
•7
& i
•5-
VULNERABLE
J6 PRODUCT
LIFE
-CYCLE
DECLINE
•3
'Xerox
1975
Focu 5 St
R3D
/
IBM
/
^
i-
"5 ^ 5 g ^
f
VERy
THlM
Dispersal
R4D
>
37
TABLE 14
XEROA
MMUFfiCTuR^Q
MRRXZTINQ
MARKETING
L 1JJ Lji^t X J
AM3JTJOIX5
MANUFACTURING-
v
!
MfiRKcTlNQ
MANUFACTURE
MARKETING
.'.»•.
'
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TABLE 16
iXDDBX
P^TH
r
Ex/on I
Burroughs
NCR
NCT
;
-sAOctf^
40
TECHNOLOGICAL
COITH I,nj
"IMFOTECH"
strategic dimensions and competitive barriers that seem to
reflect the characteristics of the main types of strategies
identified in Tables 8 through 11.
For example, Table 12 shows the firms mapped in relation to
the extent of vertical integration (the length of the value-added
chain) and the degree of committment of the firm to office
reprographics (a variable which differentiates between single
product and related product firms). We have characterized the
positioning of firms in the mapping space in terms of opportunism
versus risk. It is apparent that some of the single-technology
e
firms, - Xerox, Rotaprint, Ozalid and Gestetner - are adopting
risky strategies relative to the more opportunistic risk-balanced
«
strategy of Canon.
Table 13, which maps the firm's specialization ratio against
its R&D capability shows the very traditional, single-technology
firms, e.g. Gestetner as being vulnerable to product life cycle
decline relative to the focussed R&D strategies adopted by Canon,
IBM and latterly Xerox.
Table 14 and" 15 together link the value-added dimensions to
the scope of product line and R&D capability. Indeed, Table 15
categorizes the groups according to the nature of technology (old
versus new e.g. Gestetner v. Xerox), marketing companies (e.g.
Nashua and Savin) and manufacturing oriented, process innovation
types of companies (e.g. Canon, Ricoh). The arrows on Table 15
show the problems faced by the old technology companies in
determining which strategic moves they should follow. Should
they target movement to a manufacturing grouping, a technology
grouping or define a new grouping based on cooperation and
41
focussedness of skills?
Table 16 is a more speculative mapping in that it seeks to
capture the potential behavior of new entrants and competitors
(i.e., competition acx^ as well as H Jth in industries) from a
wider
-industry" setting-information technology. An entry path
for Kodak is drawn in order to show a direction of entry. What
Burroughs or NCR might do, or the positioning of Sharp on this
space, provides creative, insightful questions for the strategist
in developing strategic posture.
These strategic group maps, therefore, provide useful
cognitive frames for making sense of the sets of current and
future strategic positions which are possible as the
reprographics industry evolves.
in summary, it is clear that this type of "rich" industry
study, although limited mainly to Britain, provides a valuable
longitudinal analysis rather than a cross-sectional snapshot of
corporate strategies. This allows strategic patterns to be
identified (see Table 5) and- throws light upon the strategic
characteristics of first-movers in technology i„ comparison to
later, perhaps more product-diversified entrants. r„ addition,
types of strategies and kev strata,,*,, a*Y n a tegic dimensions can be
identified which, in turn, means i-h^
'
that m°re relevant strategic
groupings can be formed.
This studv also l ph 4-^ *.w~ ^y *± ed to the formulation of conclusions
regarding the behavior of firms in rj^i^jnrm declining businesses, the form
of new entry competition and the* r»™^or, c • -,a ne process of industry evaluation.
These are summarized as follows:
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(i) Behavior of Firms in Declining Industries
When the threat of technology change is perceived, thefirst response of firms is to improve their old products.
As a result the old technology reaches its peak after the
advent of the new technology. The need, however, is for
such firms to re-define their business. It emerges that the
single-technology reprographics firms of half a century ago
which failed to do so found themselves relegated to aninsignificant position, while the successful firms are those
that continually re-defined their concept of their business
across industries.
(ii) The Forms of New Entry
The process of new entry in this study was analyzed
within the framework of the firm's strategic decisions and
the strategic groupings within and across industries. It isfound that firms may enter one or more market segments andfirms operating in one segment may move to another.
Movement in or out of segments may be determined not so muchby the - industry-wide barriers'as* by mobility barriers
surrounding particular segments. This also provides the
opportunity for firms to make a gradual entry into anindustry, treating each investment stage as an incremental
decision.
(iii) The Process q£ Industry Evolution
Step-changes in technology lead to changes in market
structure and competitive conditions and to the formation of
new sets of competitors. The entry strategy chosen by these
competitors is also important in determining the change in
market structure. The height of entry barriers changes,
cost conditions change and new ways of segmentation become
available to suppliers as the extent and nature of productdifferentiation changes.
Although market structure does influence the conduct offirms, this structure is itself, to a great extent, the
outcome of the strategic decisions of firms. It is these
strategic moves, together with the technological changes
causing disturbances in market structure, that lead to the
formation and re-formation of "strategic groups".
Conclusion ?
The concept of research based upon "rich" industry histories
has been explored in this paper. The premise is that insights
about strategic interaction and the formulation of competitive
43
strategy within industries should be based upon examination not
only of current strategic conduct but also of the evolution of
industry structure. The reprographics study suggests that the
study of sources of complexity within industries, of the process
of industry evolution, of the emergence of new strategies and
competitors and of strategic groupings illuminates our ability to
make sense of competitive strategy. y e t no study can be "rich-
enough or exhaustive enough in scope (whether geographical or
analytical) to address all problems. But it can highlight the
dynamic nature of industry evolution, the range of strategies «d
positions occupied by firms over time and the sometimes temporary
nature of market leadership by
-f irst-movers^ or pioneers in
markets.
What is needed now is a consolidation of research themes and
the development of richer theory at the firm level. Single
industry studies focussed on competitive strategy must require
the use of existing economic
.theory as a benchmark model and also
engineer the incorporation of the richness of firm-level behavior
into the newer "strategic theories of the firm". Porter (1980
and 1982), Porter and Spence (1982), Caves (1980), Teece (1980)
and Rumelt (1981) are "first-movers" in this endeavor. They will
clearly be further aided by additional industry studies
incorporating the strengths of the industry history approach.
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